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Introduction
The protection of property rights involves complementarities between the 
judiciary, executive organs and administrative tribunals. It envisages a 
legislative framework and administrative protection based on an administrative 
procedure law pursued by administrative authorities and tribunals. Moreover, It 
requires an independent and competent judiciary with due integrity.
The judicial protection of private property rights determines the extent to 
which individuals and legal persons are ensured access, proper interpretation, 
efficient adjudication and appropriate judgment to their claims, counterclaims 
and defenses whenever disputes are adjudicated in courts of law. This envisages 
competence, integrity, efficiency, judicial independence, predictability and 
consistency in judicial decisions. As an exhaustive analysis on all aspects of 
these themes requires wider discussion, this comment focuses on the 
jurisprudence, consistency and predictability of some high level Ethiopian court 
decisions (particularly at the level of the Cassation Division of the Federal 
Supreme Court) on selected themes related to private property with a view to 
highlighting the practical protection of private property rights in Ethiopia.
* Hailu Burayu (LL.B, LL.M; Consultant and Attorney at Law); E. N. Stebek (LL.B, 
LL.M, PhD; Associate Professor); Muradu Abdo (LL.B, LL.M, PhD Candidate; Asst. 
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This comment is an abridged version of the fourth chapter of the research titled 
“Property Rights Protection and Private Sector Development in Ethiopia” which was 
submitted to Private Sector Development Hub at the Ethiopian Chamber of Commerce 
and Sectoral Associations. The authors are grateful to Private Sector Development 
Hub for sponsoring the research in partnership with SIDA (Swedish International 
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1 Overview of some cases that involve land rights
The current land holding system in Ethiopia gives power to both the federal and 
regional states to enact laws pertaining to land. The Federal Supreme Court’s 
Cassation Division decisions also bind lower courts in the interpretation of 
similar issues as per Article 2(4) of Proclamation No. 454/2005. Therefore, 
reference to the Cassation Division decisions on land rights is necessary to 
examine the protection of property rights.
Land rights are crucial in private sector development as no investment can be 
carried out without land.1 Article 1130 of the Civil Code gives recognition to 
land and buildings as immovables, and Article 1204 states the elements of 
ownership regarding the use, enjoyment of its fruits, and its disposal through 
donation, sale or inheritance, etc. as envisaged under Article 1205. Article 1206 
of the Civil Code entitles the owner “to claim his property from any person who 
unlawfully possesses or holds it and may oppose any act of usurpation”.
Disputing parties may settle their difference with or without the involvement 
of a third party, or through mediation or arbitration. Yet, going to courts of law 
becomes necessary when resolving a dispute becomes impossible by the parties 
themselves or through mediation or arbitration. The following cases show few 
of the themes that can give an overview of the problems of predictability, 
consistency and delay in the adjudication of property rights.
1.1 The need to recognize the economic value of land use rights
a) G/Egizabher v. Selamawit, FSC Cassation Division (File number 26130)2
The case started in the Tigray National Regional State. The mother of 
Selamawit, Dinkinesh Demisu (deceased), was married to G/Egizabher. After 
the death of her mother W/t Selamawit claimed a house with 10 rooms as heir to 
her mother. The deceased had 5 rooms built on the land before she married 
G/Egziabher, and they built 5 more rooms on the land after their marriage.
The High Court of Tigray decided that the rooms built after marriage should 
be shared between G/Egziabher and Selamawit but part of the house built before 
marriage (i.e five rooms) would exclusively belong to Selamawit and the court
1 As stated in Chapter 1, land is no more within the realm of private property under the 
existing laws of Ethiopia: i.e., Proclamation No. 31/1975 that has made rural land 
public property, and proclamation No. 47/1975 that renders urban land the property of 
the state and the Ethiopian people. Private citizens thus only exercise possessory 
rights not ownership right on rural or urban lands.
2 Alem Asmelash, (2010) “Comments on Some Land Rights Related Decisions of the 
Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division”, Ethiopian Journal of Legal Education, 
Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 154-156 (abridged)
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added that if it is possible, the land should be equally divided between the two. 
In case this is not possible, the court decided that the house should be sold and 
they should share the amount based on the proportion stated by the court. But 
there was a dissenting opinion which stated that since the land was what the 
deceased got before her marriage to G/Egziabher, the latter could only share 
from the values of five rooms built after marriage and not the land.
The dissenting opinion was upheld upon an appeal to Tigray Supreme Court, 
and the Tigray Supreme Court Cassation Division affirmed the decision of the 
Tigray Supreme Court. Petition was lodged to the Cassation Division of the 
Federal Supreme Court. The Division in rendering its judgment stated that 
individuals do not have ownership right over land but only that of possession. 
The court further stated that the mother of Selamawit had together with her 
husband built the extra five rooms after her marriage thereby conceding her 
possessory right on the land, and G/Egziabher’s share on the house cannot be 
seen separately from the land built on it.
From the decision of the Division, it can be inferred that the land and the 
house are intrinsic elements and that one cannot see the house separately from 
the land built on it so far as the current land laws are concerned. This 
interpretation evokes two questions: Can the immovable property be an intrinsic 
element of another immovable property? And are the rules of accession relevant 
to interpretation of the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division?
Regarding the first question, Article 1132 of the Civil Code of Ethiopia 
defines ‘intrinsic elements’. Article 1130 merely states land and buildings as 
immovables, and the provisions that define intrinsic elements and accessories 
are Articles 1130 to 1134. Trees and crops are clearly stated as intrinsic 
elements of the land until they are separated or until they are “subject of 
contract” which envisages their separation. The right in rem over the trees is 
determined by the right in rem over the land, and as a result any other party who 
has claim over the trees or crops has right in personam over the person who has 
ownership/possessory title over the land and not a right in rem over the trees or 
crops as long as they are intrinsic elements of the land. 3 As Stebek notes:
the Civil Code is cautious with regard to buildings, and merely defines them 
as immovables under Art. 1130. It rather treats the scenario of separate 
claims over land and buildings under the provisions that deal with accession. 
Articles 1178 and 1179 of the Civil Code envisage two different scenarios 
whereby a person has constructed a building without the objection of the 
landowner (Art. 1179), or where the building is constructed against the will 
of the landowner (Art. 1178). If the landowner did not object to the 
construction of a building, the builder could own the building but still the 
landowner can evict the builder upon payment of compensation. In case,
3 Elias N. Stebek (2012), Case Comment, unpublished.
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however, the house is built against the will of the landowner, the landowner 
may at his option evict the builder without the payment of compensation. 
Even if land has come under public ownership in Ethiopia since 1975, these 
provisions can apply mutatis mutandis to ownership over land use rights, i.e. 
possessory rights over land.
Since the deceased and G/Egziabher were in wedlock, the five rooms 
were built without the objection of the deceased. Thus, the law on accession 
enables the landowner (in this case the landholder) to evict the builder but 
should pay compensation. This clearly means, right in rem over all the 
rooms (including the ones built during the marriage) belongs to the deceased 
while G/Egziabher is entitled to right in personam, i.e compensation for his 
share in the co-ownership of the five rooms built after the marriage.4
in estates owned by companies or in case of joint ownership, land use rights 
may be capital contributions and in effect, the ownership of the use right over 
the land goes to the company or the joint owners thereby rendering Articles 
1178 and 1179 inapplicable. In the case of G/Egizabher v. Selamawit, however, 
there were already five rooms over the land to which the deceased has 
landholding title, and issue of joint ownership of use rights over the land cannot 
arise.5 Therefore, the Federal Supreme Court (FSC) Cassation Division’s 
decision does not seem to have legal basis. if equity is its basis, there can also be 
an argument in favour of Selamawit that it is inequitable and unjust to disregard 
the use right over the land that her mother had before the marriage.
Fillipos Aynalem,6 in assessing the same issue, observes that the provisions 
of the Civil Code Articles 1178 and 1179 enable us to separate the right of land 
possession/ownership from ownership over the building built on it. He further 
notes that public ownership of land does not deny citizens to have possessory 
right that is worthy in the eyes of the law, and underlines that the Constitution 
protects the possessory right of the land.
In G/Egizabher v. Selamawit, the accession rules embodied in the Civil 
Code have been unduly disregarded. The Division held that a person with a 
claim over a house shall also have a right over the use right on land no matter 
who the initial possessor of the land was, and the land cannot be seen differently 
from the house. Decisions of the FSC Cassation Division bind lower courts with 
regard to interpretation. This binding interpretation thus applies to similar issues 
in all courts of law unless the FSC Cassation Division amends it in its future
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
6 Filipos Aynalem (2009), “[Interpretation of Possessory Rights over Urban Land
(Amharic)] Journal of Ethiopian Law, Vol. 23, No.
1, August 2009.
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decisions. It is to be noted that even interpretations in which the court had erred 
remain applicable on all lower court decisions that have pursued the 
interpretation because the FSC Cassation Division’s decisions to reverse its 
former erroneous interpretation can only have prospective and not retroactive 
effect based on its recent decision under File No. 68773.7
The impact of this interpretation in private sector development is that it 
discourages the expansion of family owned business premises and rental 
property. In case of large-scale investments, land use rights can easily be capital 
contributions and spouses, joint owners, family members and shareholders can 
from the outset define their shared land use rights. In small scale improvements 
(such as modest renovations for business activities, rentals, etc.), however, a 
spouse who has real right over residential or business premises can (upon 
second marriage, for instance) be reluctant against expansion or improvement of 
the property during marriage owing to the risk of its conversion to common 
property. This significantly affects private sector development, as the supply 
side of business premises envisages not only big constructions of company- 
owned malls, but also small and medium shop premises that can benefit from 
small-scale renovations, expansions and improvements.
b) Ethiopian Road Authority v. Issa Mohammed (File number 30461)8
The case started in Illubabor, Oromia National Regional State. Issa had license 
to produce sand on the land he was given through lease. But while a road was 
being built on the area, the Ethiopian Roads Authority took the already 
produced sand worth Birr 30,000 that belonged to Ato Isssa. He instituted a case 
at the Oromia High Court, and the court ordered the Ethiopian Roads Authority 
to pay the amount. On appeal, the Oromia Supreme Court affirmed the decision 
of the High court. Thus, the case went to the FSC Cassation Division.
The Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division held that by virtue Article 
6(18) of the Ethiopian Roads Authority Re-establishing Proclamation 80/1997, 
the Authority can, for the purpose of road construction and maintenance and 
other purposes, use land and stone-like resources for free and is only obliged to 
pay compensation for properties of the land. It reversed the decision of the 
Oromia Supreme Court which had held that the Ethiopian Roads Authority Re­
establishing Proclamation 80/1997 does not allow the Authority to take away 
sand found on the land held by another person. On the contrary, the FSC 
Cassation Division remarked that since land and all natural resources are owned
7 Getachew Deyas andFantu Tesfaye v. Rukia Kedir, File No. 68773, Federal Supreme 
Court Cassation Division Decisions, Vol. 13, pp. 623-625.
8 Cassation File No. 30461, Hidar 3, 2000 E.C., published in Mizan Law Review, Vol. 3 
No. 2 (2009).
by the people and the government, the latter and the people should use the 
resources for free.
The FSC Cassation Division held that even if Issa had the license to produce 
sand, the resources are owned by the government and the people, and the latter 
can legitimately take away the resources. Issa’s plea for the value of the sand 
and for the expense incurred to produce the sand was rejected and the Cassation 
Division decided that the Ethiopian Road Authority is not obliged to pay the 
amount.
This decision does not recognize the economic value of use rights on land, 
and it takes the interpretation of Article 40(3) of the Constitution to its extreme 
application. This allows a government entity to take any resource obtained from 
land without compensation even if a person extracts the resource based on a 
license to undertake a business activity.
The court should have made a distinction between the Authority’s 
entitlement to extract sand and the act of confiscating another person’s property 
which is already extracted and ready for transportation. Distinction should have 
also been made between ownership vis-a-vis the limited scope of bare 
ownership (plus regulatory powers) that the state has over land on which a 
person has use right. while the state is the bare owner who is entitled to collect 
lease price, land rent, etc., the right to use and enjoy the products from the 
resource clearly belongs to the landholder.
The case Ethiopian Roads Authority v. Genenew W/Yohannes also involved 
sand taken by the Authority in which the Cassation Division affirmed the 
decision it rendered in the case Ethiopian Roads Authority v. Issa by stipulating 
that there is no legal ground for the Authority to be obliged to pay for the value 
of sand it took from Genenew.9 The Cassation Division stated that all resources 
belong to the people and the government, and thus the government should not be 
obliged to pay compensation for the resources.
Apparently, the sand is not in its natural state in both cases. A person holding 
license to extract sand in a given location (stated in the license) spends time and 
energy to extract sand thereby adding value to it. Although Ethiopian Roads 
Authority is going to use the sand for road construction, it would have been fair 
to order the Authority to pay compensation for the sand. This is a clear example 
of the Cassation Division’s jurisprudence which disregards economic value to 
the use rights on land. This should indeed be rectified because private business 
development envisages recognition to the use value of land to which an 
individual or a legal person is entitled.
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1.2 Judicial authority to examine administrative revocation of 
landholding title
In File No. 2271910 a petition to the FSC Cassation Division was lodged by 
Addis Ababa Urban Land Administration and Urban Development Bureau in 
which the petitioner sought reversal of the decision of lower courts which 
required the Bureau to withdraw its unlawful revocation of landholding and 
house ownership titles. The Bureau had revoked land holding title No.32221 
and house ownership title No. 17/3/91, an act that was contested by Negash as 
unlawful. The lower court examined the case and rendered its decision in favour 
of Negash Dubale in File No. 503/88 that required the Administrative Bureau to 
issue landholding and house ownership titles for House Numbers 1304, 1305 
and 1306 situated in Higher 17 Kebele 20. Execution proceeding of the decision 
was further instituted under File No. 90/92 based on which the Bureau was 
ordered to allow the continued validity of the landholding title and the house 
ownership title.
The FSC Cassation Division ruled that as long as the Bureau has revoked the 
landholding and house ownership titles of the houses, there is no vested interest 
(as per Article 33(2) of the Civil Procedure Code) that justifies judicial 
litigation, and the lower courts should not have adjudicated the case. The 
Cassation Division held that the law confers authority over the administrative 
authority to provide or revoke such titles, and any grievance in this regard 
should have been instituted not in courts of law but in the complaint procedures 
of the relevant administrative authority. This decision and its aftermath clearly 
affect the protection of private property rights and private sector development.
The landholding and house ownership titles were issued to Negash which 
render him holder of property rights. As long as the revocation was contested in 
a court of law, the administrative authority is clearly duty bound to justify the 
legality of its actions. If it fails to do so, its act of revocation (^^h^) is clearly 
an ultra vires act which, according to Article 401 of the Civil Code, is of no 
effect. In other words, as long as the Bureau had no authority to revoke the 
landholding and house ownership titles, it is void ab initio (void from the 
beginning), and the revocation should have been declared of no effect.
Article 401(1) of the Civil Code provides that “Acts performed by the bodies 
referred to in [Article 394 ff] in excess of the powers given to them by law or 
without the observance of the conditions or formalities required by law shall be 
of no effect”. This applies even if it is not “expressly provided by law in such
10 Addis Ababa Urban Land Administration and Urban Development Bureau v. Negash 
Dubale, Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions, Vol. 6, pp. 176-178.
circumstances”.11 According to Art. 402, the nullity may be invoked by any 
interested party.
Administrative authorities should not thus be entitled to confer and revoke 
property rights at will, and it is the role of courts to examine and annul ultra 
vires acts. Or else, the ultimate fate of property rights holders would depend on 
the good intentions or adverse decisions of administrative authorities which may 
be arbitrary. Fortunately, there are recent developments in favour of a new line 
of interpretation in the Federal Supreme Court regarding the authority of courts 
to examine the legality of the issuance or revocation of landholding title deeds 
where it becomes an issue in the course of litigation. The decisions of the 
Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division in File No. 67011 (Taitu Kebede’s 
Heirs v. Tirunesh et al), File No. 64014 (Genet Seyoum v. Kirkos Sub-City 
Kebele 17/18 Administration et al) and File No. 48217 (Abadit L. v. Zalambesa 
Town Administration & Berhane Z.) illustrate this fact.
1.3 Contractual benefits in the absence of landholding titles
Teklemariam12 built a house (House No. 367(b)), Woreda 17, Kebele 15 and he 
rented it to Adane who in return, without seeking consent from the lessor rented 
some part of the house to Fetlework. The tenant refused to pay him the rent, and 
Teklemariam brought an action against him. Adane requested the court to allow 
the Addis Ababa land Administration to intervene in the litigation on the ground 
that the lessor (Teklemariam) does not have landholding title for the land or 
house construction permit to build the house. Both lower courts rejected the 
objections and ordered the respondents to pay the arrears of the rent and 
handover the house to Teklemariam.
The lessees filed a petition at the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division. 
The Cassation Division decided in favor of the intervener (Addis Ababa City 
Land Administration) on the ground that the lessor has no landholding title and 
house construction permit. The respondents (lessees) were required to handover 
the land and the house to the intervener (Addis Ababa City Land 
Administration) on the ground that urban land belongs to the state, and it cannot 
be owned privately.
The two grounds that constituted the basis for the decisions of the lower 
courts were first, no evidence has been produced which proves that the 
particular land under consideration is nationalized, and secondly the illegal 
construction of the house is an issue that can only be invoked by the relevant 
administrative entities and not by the lessees.
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11 Civil Code, Art. 401(2).
12 Addis Ababa City Administration v. Teklemariam Mekonnen (File Number 24269) 
Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions, Vol. 6, pp. 185-187.
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The issue in litigation should have been whether there is a contract between 
the parties in dispute, and the issue of title should have been a different issue 
that could have been handled by the relevant administrative offices. According 
to Article 1732 of the Civil Code, “contracts shall be interpreted in accordance 
with good faith having regard to the loyalty of confidence which should exist 
between the parties according to business practice.” The lessee who invokes the 
issue of landholding title clearly intends to avoid payment of the house rent, 
because the existence or nonexistence of landholding title or house construction 
permit is not among the relevant elements for the services obtained in the course 
of using the premises.
Even if there was a law that could have rendered such contracts untenable 
and invalid (owing to defects in the property rights of the lessor), the contracting 
parties should have, by virtue of Article 1815 of the Civil Code, been reinstated 
to their pre-contract positions because the provision clearly provides that upon 
invalidation of a contract “the parties shall be as much as possible be reinstated 
in the position which could have existed, had the contract not been made.”
According to Article 1179(1) of the Civil Code, “Whosoever has erected a 
building on land [which is] the property of another [person] without the landlord 
objecting to the building shall be the owner of such building.” However, the 
relevant authority can order the demolition of any construction that is made 
without prior permit, according to Article 7(1) of Construction and Use of 
Urban Houses Proclamation No. 292/1986.
Such houses are not built overnight and there is a house number given to the 
house. This implies that the administrative entity that has given number to the 
house is aware of its construction. Many illegal holdings and constructions have 
been regularized where they do not violate the basic master plan and 
redevelopment plans of the city. Accordingly, the lessor could have been 
beneficiary in the regularization schemes undertaken by Addis Ababa City 
Administration in series of rounds.
In Gezahegn Adinew v. Dasash Baynesagn,1 the Federal Supreme Court 
Cassation Division pursued a different line of interpretation over a relatively 
similar issue. The petitioner built a house on the land of the respondents based 
on permission obtained from them. Due to disagreement, the respondents 
evicted the petitioner from their land. The lower courts entitled Gezahegn to 
receive one fourth of the price of the house as per Art 1180(2) of the Civil Code, 
and required him to surrender the house to respondents. However, the FSC 
Cassation Division reversed the decision of the lower courts on the ground that 
land belongs to the state and peoples of Ethiopia, and hence respondents do not 
have the right to allow a house to be constructed on any piece of land that does 13
13 Gezahegn Adinew v. Dasash Baynesagn, File No. 30101, Federal Supreme Court 
Cassation Division Decisions, Vol. 6, pp. 203-205.
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not belong to them. On the basis of this decision, the petitioner became an 
owner of a house that he built on a piece of land given to him by individuals 
who have no legal power to do so. The relevance of such cases is that there 
ought to be predictability and consistency in case analysis and decisions.
1.4 Examples of Delay in court decisions and challenges in the 
enforcement of court decrees
Delay in court decisions and execution of judgments is among the challenges 
that adversely affect property rights protection. For example, there has been a 
delay of six years to decide on the amount suggested by independent chartered 
accountants in relation to financial report submitted by the plaintiff in Habteab 
Tesfa Building Construction Contractor v. Ethiopian Telecommunication 
Corporation (File No. 31934). The case is still pending at the Federal First 
Instance Court. While the claim involves Birr 400,000, the auditor’s suggested 
figure is Birr 388,000
The challenges in the reluctance of various administrative organs to enforce 
court decisions and decrees can be illustrated by the following examples that are 
stated in the decision rendered by the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme 
Court in Tewolde Bisrat et al, Tahsas 04, 2004 E.C, File No. 6777714:
a) In Prosecutor v. Tekabe, Criminal Cases File No. 162887, the court ordered 
release on bail on Tir 2nd 2002 E.C. (January 10, 2010), but Tekabe stayed 
under detention in the Customs and Revenue Administration Police Station 
for ten months.
b) Mesfin Kassahun (File No. 169690) was released 6 months after court order 
for release on bail was issued on Ginbot 24, 2002 E.C (June 1, 2010).
c) Hailu Worku and Louisa Farmeta (File No. 167550) were imprisoned for 
over eight months after the court’s order that they be released on bail.
d) Mengistu Abraham and Ahmed Mohammed (File No. 172759) and Bamlak 
Yismaw (File No. 170203) stayed for over 3 months at Customs Police after 
court decisions of release on bail.
2. Subjecting Expropriation Disputes to Judicial 
Scrutiny
Some might argue that the imbalance created by the present expropriation laws 
of Ethiopia can be rectified if the judiciary was allowed to entertain major 
disputes relating to expropriation including the question of public purpose. 
Nevertheless, allowing persons affected by land expropriation to resort to 
regular courts might not necessarily work in favor of the poor if there is deficit
14 Tewolde Bisrat et al, Tahsas 04, 2004 E.C., File No. 67777, Federal Supreme Court 
Cassation Division Cassation Decisions, Vol. 13, pp. 266-270.
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in the independence of the judiciary in relation to cases that are deemed or 
perceived to matter to the authorities.
In Ethiopia, there had been a historic formal fusion between the judiciary and 
the executive impacting the present independence of the former. Assefa notes:15 
In historic Ethiopia, adjudication of cases formed part and parcel of 
public administration. one finds a merger of functions within the 
executive, the administration of justice and the executive function 
proper. ...This blend of judicial and executive functions in the latter is 
not without implications. First and foremost, the judiciary never had a 
separate existence of its own as an institution. It was subject to all kinds 
of pressures from the other branches.
Currently, the country's judicial system has moved away from its earlier formal 
dependence towards its legal and constitutional independence. But there are 
doubts about its detachment in reality from the legacy of dependence. At present, 
the judiciary's formal independence is unambiguously stated in the FDRE 
Constitution, which declares that: ''An independent judiciary is established. 
Courts of any level shall be free from any interference of. ..any governmental 
body, government official or from any other source.judges shall be directed 
solely by the law.''16
Yet, “[t]here is a perception that the autonomy of the judiciary in Ethiopia is 
weak.”17 Assefa states “. external pressure on the judiciary has deep roots and
15 Assefa Fiseha, Federalism and the Accommodation of Diversity in Ethiopia: A 
Comparative Study (hereinafter Federalism and Accommodation), (Netherlands, Wolf 
Legal Publishers, 2005/06) p. 390; see also Chi Mgbako et al, Silencing the Ethiopian 
Courts: Non-Judicial Constitutional Review and its Impact on Human Rights, 32 
Fordham International Law Journal1 259 (2008); where it is asserted that “The 
executive branch has the power to do as it wishes with no judicial checks on its 
activities.” at 289-290 & 296. See also Tigist Assefa, Judicial Review of 
Administrative Actions: A Comparative Analysis (LL.M Thesis, School of Law,
Addis Ababa University,) (2010) available at
<http://etd.aau.edu.et/dspace/bitstream/123456789/2154/1/Tigist%20Asefa.pdf> 
(Accessed: December, 22, 2011).
16 See Article 78/1 and Article 79/2& 3 of the FDRE Constitution.
17 African Development Bank: Country Governance Profile: Ethiopia (hereinafter 
Country Governance Profile) (2009) at
<http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and- 
0perations/Ethiopia%20%E2%80%93%20Country%20Governance%20Profile%20E 
N.pdf> (Accessed January 11, 2012) at 11; see also The Canadian International 
Development Agency, Independence, Transparency and Accountability in the 
Judiciary of Ethiopia (2008) (Unpublished, on file with the author) pp. 99-101 & 135­
138.
362 Mizan Law Review Vol. 7 No.2, December 2013
is not without some hangovers on the new federal judiciary. Administrators at 
state level, even today, think that it is natural to order the judge...”.18
A long history of centralized governmental authority and a judiciary 
subjugated to the executive branch has fostered a weak judicial branch with 
reduced capacity to exercise genuine independence, as well as a reticence of 
other branches to treat the judiciary as either truly independent or co-equal.19 
In particular, “.where government interests are at stake, direct interference 
has been noted.”20
According to the Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011, in terms of 
juridical independence, Ethiopia ranks 89th out of 139 nations, which has 
shown an improvement from its previous ranking, but Ethiopia's standing is still 
low in the ranking index.21 This is despite the fact that the country has put in 
place a judicial reform program whose key objective is “the promotion of 
professional and autonomous judiciary”.22 This is on the top of the numerous 
factors which inhibit the judiciary's assertiveness,23 accessibility, effectiveness 
and efficiency.24 Thus, in the current state of the judiciary, it is doubtful if the 
judiciary would assert its autonomy in respect of cases involving land 
expropriations if the question of public purpose and other expropriation 
questions were made subject to judicial challenge.
18 Assefa Fiseha, Federalism and Accommodation supra note 18, p. 390.
19 The World Bank, Judicial and Legal Assessment Judicial and Legal Assessment 
(2004) at
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/EthiopiaSA.pdf> 
(accessed January 11, 2012) pp. 19 & 21-23.
20 Id., at 21.
21 World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011 at 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2010-11.pdf, 
(last viewed December 21, 2011) at 155.
22 Country Governance Profile supra note 20, p. 11.
23 There is a tendency to restrict the turfs of its power even in cases which are deemed 
ordinary. This is particularly true when it comes to reviewing the actions of executive 
organs. For instance, in Ethiopian Privatization and Public Enterprises Supervising 
Authority vs Heirs of Mr. Nour Beza, (Fed. Sup. Ct. Cassation File No. 23608, 
2000E.C.) in the Decisions of the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Vol. 5 
(Addis Ababa: Federal Supreme Court, 2001 E.C.) pp. 304-305, where the court has 
reasoned that 'in the Ethiopian context, judicial power of the regular courts is not 
inherent but it emanates from the positive law and that where bodies other than 
regular courts are given by the law the power to render final and binding decisions 
then regular courts cannot size upon such matters even by way of review.'
24 Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia: Comprehensive Justice Reform Program: 
Base Line Study Report (Amsterdam, Center for International Legal Cooperation, 
2005) pp. 77-89 & 213-227.
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The above argument should not send the message that a judiciary that 
operates within a modus operandi of centuries of strong judicial tradition would 
necessarily award a generous compensation or adopt a restrictive notion of 
public purpose. The latter point can be illustrated by taking the 2005 Kelo 
decision handed down by the US Supreme Court.25 In this case, the court has 
upheld the decision of a city government to take land from one private person 
to give it to another for economic redevelopment purpose implying the 
interpretation by the judiciary of public purpose broadly to mean any project 
that would entail direct or indirect benefit to the public in the form of tax 
revenues and jobs.26
But the context of the Kelo case is different from the broader notion of 
public purpose in place in Ethiopia. Unlike Ethiopia, the public purpose test in 
the US is unmistakably open to judicial scrutiny. And the Kelo expropriation 
took place in the context of comprehensive government plan which passed 
through public hearings, and followed by approval from a democratically 
elected local government.
The US Supreme Court delivered the Kelo decision in the context of 
property rights notion different from the one prevalent in the Ethiopia. The 
Kelo case was litigated in the country with a strong tradition of private property 
protection as opposed to Ethiopia where such protection has historically been 
weaker. In the Kelo case, those who opposed the taking by the city government 
argued, amongst others, that “the symbolic value of home and ownership” is 
“something that cannot be entirely compensated monetarily”27 perhaps because 
home ownership is seen as a kind of non-fungible property as articulated in 
Radin's personhood theory of property as opposed to arguments based on the
25 See Annette M. Kim. “Land Takings in the Private Interest: Comparisons of Urban 
Land Development Controversies in the United States, China, and Vietnam.” 
Cityscape 11.1 (2009): 19- 32. See also Antonio Azuela and Carlos Herrera-Martin 
(2009), “Taking Land Around the World: International Trends in Expropriation for 
Urban and Infrastructure Projects” in Somik V. Lall, Mila Freire, Belinda Yuen, 
Robin Rajack and Jean-Jacques Helluin (eds.), Urban Land Markets Improving Land 
Management for Successful Urbanization (Springer Netherlands); see also Daniel B. 
Kelly (2005), “The Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain Law: A Rationale 
Based on Secret Purchases and Private Influence” Discussion Paper No. 5 07/2005, 
Harvard Law School at
<http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/fellows_papers/pdf/Kelly_5.pdf>
. (Viewed January 11, 2012) W. Keating (Book Review), Rachelle Alterman, Takings 
International, A Comparative Perspective on Land use Regulations and 
Compensation Rights, (Chicago, IL. ABA Publishing, 2010) p. 363.
26 Carol L. Zeiner (2010), “Eminent Domain Wolves in Sheep's Clothing: Private 
Benefit Masquerading As Classic Public Use, 28 Virginia Environmental Law 
Journal 1 pp. 10-11.
27 Annette Kim, supra note 28, p. 24.
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deprivation of the subsistence asset of people in Ethiopia. In the Kelo case, the 
taking of private home from high or middle income persons took place in order 
to advance public interest in the context of city redevelopment with a view to 
attracting new businesses while takings in Ethiopia occur for economic 
development in the sense of taking farmland from low income rural people. 
Unlike Ethiopia, where the expropriation law is mainly federalized, states in the 
US can issue their own expropriation law. For instance, after Kelo several states 
have passed statutes restricting the broad reach of the Supreme Court's 
interpretation of the standard of public use.28
3 Selected Issues on Subletting Business Premises and 
Intellectual Property
3.1 The right to sublet business premises
In Emebet Mekonnen v. Woreda 20 Kebele 29,29 the lessee had sublet her 
business (a hotel) to another person without obtaining permissions from its 
owner, the Kebele. Emebet had made improvements worth Birr 300,000 (three 
hundred thousand) based on the permission she had obtained from the Kebele. 
The lessee later on refused to give the premises back to Emebet on the ground 
that the Kebele has taken its premises back, and has leased it to them. The 
Kebele argued that it has terminated its lease with Emebet and has let it to the 
new occupants who are using it for hotel business.
Article 145(1) of the Commercial Code recognizes the right of the leasee to 
assign or sublet or to sell his business without obtaining permission from the 
lessor. This includes the transfer of the right to lease the business premises. 
During the litigation, the Kebele invoked the Directive issued by the 
Government Houses Rental Agency which prohibits subletting business 
premises without its permission, and it argued that Emebet’s acts violate this 
Directive and the lease contract with her is duly terminated. The High Court 
rejected the Kebele’s arguments and decided that the Kebele did not prove its 
authority to terminate the contract and did not submit evidence about the 
termination of the rental contract between Emebet and the Kebele. It also stated 
that the term of sub-lease between Emebet and the persons who have refused to 
pay her the rent has not ended, and held that the sub-lessees are bound to pay the 
arrears and damages.
28 Chenglin Liu (2008), “The Chinese Takings Law from a Comparative Perspective”, 
Journal of Law & Policy, pp. 331-332.
29 Emebet Mekonnen v. Woreda 20 Kebele 29, File No. 31264, Federal Supreme Court 
Cassation Division Decisions, Vol. 9, pp. 140-142.
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This decision was reversed by the Federal Supreme Court, and ultimately 
reinstated by the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division. The Cassation 
Division stated that Article 145(1) of the Commercial Code allows businessmen 
to sublet their business including its premises without prior permission from the 
owner of the premises. Likewise, the Cassation Division has (under File No. 
34586) recognized the right of the lessee to sell his business without obtaining 
the prior consent of the lessor, i.e. Agency for Government Houses). The 
Cassation Division’s interpretation of Article 145(1) of the Commercial Code is 
indeed commendable, and such decisions have significant contribution in 
controlling abuse of powers by administrative agencies.
A case in point is the Directive issued by the Agency for Government Houses 
(issued in Hedar 2004 Eth. Calendar, i.e. November, 2011) which prohibits sub­
letting or assigning business premises to a third party. This directive clearly 
violates Article 145(1) of the Commercial Code which is very fundamental in 
the smooth operation of business activities and private sector development. 
Federal courts are deciding in favor of the Agency for Government Houses 
citing this directive (which is currently in the process of some revision), while 
losing parties argue that the Agency does not have the power to issue such 
directive. Cassation petitions are expected to be made soon.
The decision of the Cassation Division in Emebet Mekonnen v. Woreda 20 
Kebele 29 was rendered in January 2009, and it remains to be seen whether the 
Cassation Division will maintain its position, or uphold current or future 
administrative directives even if they violate Article 145(1) of the Commercial 
Code.
3.2 Intellectual property: Sample cases
In Ethio-Cermaic P.L.C v. Ethiopian Intellectual Property office & Ovorgiga 
Technology Limited30 the 2nd respondent Ovorgiga Technology requested 1st 
respondent to register its trademark Ethio Cement encircled with ten stars. 
Ethiopian Intellectual Property Office (EIPO) did not hesitate to register this 
trademark. The petitioner stated its objections to the registration and the 
granting of certificate of registration and submitted its objections to 1st 
respondent (Ethiopian Intellectual Property Office). The petitioner claimed that 
it had obtained registration certificate under the trademark “Ethio Cement’ to 
use it for marketing its cement products.
According to the petitioner, allowing the 2nd respondent to use this trademark 
will create confusion in a manner prejudicial to another trader. It claimed that 
using identical or similar distinguishing mark violates Article 141(2) of the
30 Ethio-Cermaic P.L.C v. Ethiopian Intellectual Property office & Ovorgiga 
Technology Limited, File No. 57179, Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division 
Decisions, Vol. 12, p.544- 548.
Commercial Code, and the decision of the 1st respondent contravenes Trade 
Practices Proclamation 329/2003 and Trademark Registration Proclamation 
501/2006. The Cassation Division reversed the decision of the 1st respondent 
and decided that the 2nd respondent cannot be allowed to use trademark for 
marketing its product.
in another case31 the Cassation Division rejected the filing of a legal action 
at the Federal Court of First instance directly when one is dissatisfied by the 
decision of Ethiopian Intellectual Property Office. According to the Cassation 
Division, a person aggrieved by the decision of the Ethiopian intellectual 
Property Office shall file an appeal at the Federal High Court. It appears that 
this is not consistent with the position it took under File No. 57179 (i.e., Ethio- 
Cermaic P.L.C v. Ethiopian Intellectual Property office & Ovorgiga 
Technology Limited). The Cassation Division has confirmed its position under 
File No 63454.32
Article 17(1) of the Trademark Registration and Protection Proclamation No. 
501/2006 recognizes the right of an aggrieved party to appeal to a court having 
jurisdiction in connection with registration of trademark. However, the court to 
which an appeal can be lodged is not identified under the Proclamation. 
According to Article 49 of the Proclamation, “the Federal Courts shall have 
jurisdiction” but it does not specifically state whether it refers to the Federal 
Courts of First Instance or Federal High Court.
In spite of such challenges in terms of clarity and consistency, there are 
indeed commendable cassation decisions that give due attention to intellectual 
property rights. Cases in point are the decisions of the Federal Supreme Court 
Cassation Division with regard the copyright protection that should be accorded 
to translation works in File No. 44520 (20 October 2009),33 and the decision of 
the Cassation Division in File No. 68369 (January 13, 2012),34 which held that 
the form in which ideas are expressed are entitled to copyright protection even if 
the ideas are not original. This duly indicates that copyright protection refers to 
original expressions which might not necessarily emanate from new ideas or 
information.
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31 Ethiopian Intellectual Property Office v. Tibebe Ayele, File No. 59025, Federal 
Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions, Vol. 12, pp. 549-553.
32 Dat International Trading PLC owner Dr. Tenaye Abitew v. EIPO Y Civa Sante 
Pharmacy SA, File No 63454, Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions, 
Vol. 13, pp. 378-382.
33 Artistic Printing Press v. Getahun Shiberu, File No. 44520, Federal Supreme Court 
Cassation Division Decisions Volume: 10, pp 339-341.
34 Samuel Hailu & Horizon Printing Press PLC —v. - Simret Ayalew, File No. 68369, 
Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions Volume 13, pp. 576-581
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Conclusion: Challenges in Material and Non-financial 
Incentives
The judicial system in Ethiopia has relatively clear structure and it includes 
federal and regional level courts. However there is increasingly growing 
concern about the level of competence in many courts which can be attributable 
to the unsatisfactory remuneration and other factors which need to be addressed 
so that judges with exemplary competence and integrity can be retained. The 
level of public confidence in relation with competence, impartiality and integrity 
needs utmost attention in the absence of which property rights cannot obtain the 
level of protection commensurate with the needs of private sector development
The judiciary can hardly attract and retain such judges under the current 
remuneration scale and prevailing non-financial incentives. Filipos Aynalem 
raises the question ‘What is the salary that justice deserves to be paid?’ and 
compares the remuneration scale of judges with other legal services in the 
context of the steadily rising cost of living such as housing rentals and 
transportation. He, among others, raises the salary scale in the Commercial Bank 
of Ethiopia for the Head of Legal Services, i.e. Over Birr 26,000 [an apparently 
deserved payment] vis-a-vis the extremely low salary range for judges which 
(subject to some variation in the future) was as follows in October 2013:
a) Birr 3,085 to Birr 5,243 for First Instance Court judges;
b) Birr 4,186 to 7,061 for Federal High Court Judges, and
c) Birr 5,051 to 7,890 for Supreme Court Justices. 35
This raises the issue whether a country’s treasury should generate revenue from 
court fees, or whether such fees can be ploughed back to the judiciary so that 
remuneration for judges can be significantly raised.
In the realm of non-financial incentives, there is the need to enhance rule of 
law, the independence of courts as enshrined in the Constitution and the tenure 
of judges. These factors coupled with the level of judicial scrutiny that should be 
put in place to harness discretionary powers of administrative entities determine 
the degree of law enforcement and the fairness, efficiency and predictability of 
judicial decisions that can enhance the complementarities between laws, 
administrative decisions and adjudication. ______ ■
35 Filipos Aynalem, “What is the salary that justice deserves to be paid?’ (Yefitih 
demozwa sint new?), Addis Guday, Volume 7, No. 185, Tikimt 2, 2006 E.C. 
(October 10, 2013), pp. 22-23.
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